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Is the decade of large scale piracy off the coast of Somali over? What are the lessons from
Somali piracy for maritime security governance? This article revisits the triggers of piracy
and argues for the need of being cautious since the current success in curbing piracy might
not be sustainable. I identify six factors that trigger piracy: (1) geography, (2) weak law
enforcement and corruption, (3) maritime insecurity, (4) economic dislocation, (5) cultural
acceptability and skills and (6) the prevalence of criminal minded entrepreneurs. An analysis
of the rise and decline of piracy provides an explanation of why the international measures
show success, but document that it is questionable if these will contain piracy in the long
run. The measures address two of the factors (law enforcement and cultural acceptability)
primarily. Studying the decline of Somali piracy reveals the importance of learning some
major lessons for reevaluating the importance and character of maritime security. Future
efforts will be necessary to increase the quality and efﬁciency of maritime security governance.
Keywords: African maritime security; maritime security governance; Somali piracy
Introduction
The decade of large scale piracy off the coast of Somali appears to be over. Since 2012 there has
not been a successful hijacking attempt. Yet, this does not imply that piracy and armed robbery in
the Indian Ocean is no longer occurring. But if it does, it is on a lower scale, and concerns smaller
local trading and ﬁshing vessels and is outside of the radar of the international community. More-
over, according to a report of the UNMonitoring Group pirates have not gone out of business, but
into other (illicit) businesses.1 Arguably it is still the time to be optimistic that the various
measures adopted to curb piracy in the regions have shown effect. Has piracy off Somalia
been eradicated once and for all? In this contribution I argue for the need of being cautious
about the current success and the importance of learning some major lessons from Somali
piracy. My core argument is that if these lessons are not learned and some signiﬁcant efforts
are made to build sustainable solutions that can tackle maritime insecurity in the long run,
piracy might return to the region.
I start in brieﬂy revisiting the factors that are known to be the triggers of piracy and reﬂect on
how these provide an explanation for the rise of Somali piracy. I proceed in discussing the
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prevailing explanations for the decline of Somali piracy. Core reasons for the decline can be seen
in the measures adopted by the shipping industry, including the employment of armed guards, the
successful international naval programme and international prosecutions, as well as the declining
support of local communities for piracy. Investigating these reasons leads to the conclusion that
many of the factors that trigger piracy still pertain. This centrally concerns the high degree of mar-
itime insecurity in the region. A primary goal hence has to be improving the quality and efﬁcacy
of maritime security governance in the region. Based on this analysis I draw some core lessons of
Somali piracy for maritime security governance. This concerns the importance of broader con-
texts of maritime insecurity, the nature of maritime threats, the relation between security and
development policies, as well as the importance of functional cooperation and of private–
public coordination. I end in outlining what future efforts will be necessary to tackle piracy in
the long run.
Understanding the emergence of Somali piracy
The meanwhile extensive piracy studies literature provides us with a good understanding of which
factors trigger the outbreak of piracy.2 Studies on the so called “root causes” of piracy and on the
regional variations of piracy operations and their sophistication have elaborated various factors.
Five triggers can be condensed from the literature: geography; weak law enforcement; maritime
insecurity; economic dislocation; and cultural acceptability. Taken together these provide us with
a good understanding of why piracy in Somalia has emerged.
Geography
Geography ﬁrstly refers to the obvious fact that regions with close proximity to waterways tend to
have piracy. Proximity to major lanes of transportation and major ports renders piracy more lucra-
tive and hence increases the likelihood of piracy. Geography also refers to the existence of hide-
outs, that is coastal strips or islands which are difﬁcult to reach or control. Hideouts are necessary
for preparing a piracy operation and for the case of ransom piracy to anchor the vessel. Piracy
dens require basic infrastructure, such as roads or nearby villages to ensure the logistics
needed for an operation. In principle piracy operations can also be launched from ports, especially
if they are weakly governed and surveilled. In geographical terms Somalia has an impressive
coastline of 3025 km. The Gulf of Aden, the southern gateway to the Suez Canal, is one of the
major trading routes, with more than 20,000 ships a year, including a substantial number of
the world’s crude oil, navigating through it. A signiﬁcant number of remote coastal villages
provide dens and a sufﬁcient infrastructure for kidnap and ransom piracy.
Weak law enforcement
The factor of weak law enforcement stresses that the lower the risk of getting caught and punished
for piracy, the higher the likelihood that piracy occurs. This concerns various levels of law enfor-
cement stretching from coast guard and naval capabilities by which coastlines and the sea are
patrolled and surveilled, to policing, intelligence and persecution capabilities on land, as well
as the efﬁciency of the judicial sector allowing for the prosecution of piracy. As shown in
various studies the prevalence of ofﬁcial corruption is a further major factor impacting the
likelihood of piracy, since pirates do not always operate outside the law but often in collaboration
with law enforcement agencies.3 Finally, also the quality of regional inter-state collaboration in
maritime security matters has to be considered. Pirates operate across (maritime) borders and
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efﬁcient collaboration mechanisms are needed to allow for hot pursuit of perpetrators as well as
the sharing of intelligence and evidence between national agencies.
Somalia’s maritime, coastal and territorial law enforcement has been weak after years of civil
conﬂict. Yet, Somalia has never been in a state of lawlessness. Basic law enforcement is provided
through the rudimentary policing and judicial capacities of the regional governments, such as the
government of Puntland. Perhaps more importantly, the mechanisms of the traditional clan-based
law of Xeer govern wide parts of the Somali society (van Notten, 2007). Yet, as a deliberative
form of law based on compensations, crimes such as piracy are not subject to it if members of
Somali clans are not involved as victims. Clearly there was and is a lack of capacities to police
effectively the Somali coast and the sea or persecute suspects, in Somalia as well as littoral
countries. Moreover, there have been frequent accusations that parts of Somali governmental
elites beneﬁt from or even participate in piracy operations, which points out that corruption is
endemic.
Maritime insecurity
A factor closely related to weak law enforcement is the degree to which the maritime environment
of a region is insecure and prone to violence. Piracy tends to occur in seas in which there is a host
of other illegal activity, such as trafﬁcking, smuggling and illegal ﬁshing. This is not only related
to the question of coast guarding and law enforcement at sea, but also in how far violence and
insecurity at sea is considered to be the norm. The more the maritime environment is securitized
and it is, for instance, normal to carry weapons at sea, the higher the likelihood of piracy.
The coastal waters of Somalia were even under the Siad Barre regime weakly governed. Since
the end of the regime and the withdrawal of the maritime component of the UN operation in 1995,
insecurity in Somali waters has continuously increased (Weir, 2009). Insecurity is not only related
to informal and often illicit trade which includes trafﬁcking of people or small arms. Weakly
regulated ﬁshing has been a main source of insecurity (Hansen, 2008; Weir, 2009). With the
practice of selling ﬁshing licences to foreign companies by warlords in the 1990s and offering
armed protection services to ﬁshing companies, as well as the fact that international ﬁshing
vessels increasingly have become armed, Somali waters increasingly became a securitized and
indeed militarized space.
Economic dislocation
Rightfully piracy has often been described as a business model and seen as an activity that is pri-
marily economically motivated. While piracy promises considerable revenues, a direct causal link
between poverty or lack of employment opportunities and piracy cannot be constructed. Rather
than poverty per se, the crucial factor is economic dislocation. Communities that tend to
engage in piracy are those which have been economically marginalized, have been put at a dis-
advantage by economic developments and globalization processes or are not allowed to partici-
pate in sources of wealth.
Economic dislocation refers to Somalia in at least two senses. One the one hand with the end
of the UN intervention in the 1990s, Somalia became a territory that received only scant attention
from the international community. While humanitarian aid continued to ﬂow, before counter-
piracy changed the picture, Somalia has neither beneﬁtted from large scale international develop-
ment support, nor gained a share of globalization induced economic wealth. Hence, for instance
Kamola (2012, p. 17) suggests that Somali piracy can be “understood as creative (and proﬁtable)
attempts to develop a vibrant economic sphere within places marginalized from the world
economy for more than a century”.4
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On the other hand, one has also to account for the fact that coastal communities belong to the
marginalized parts of the population within Somalia. In a primarily pastoral society in which cattle
implies prestige, coastal communities which largely rely on subsistence ﬁshing have lower status.
With maritime insecurity and foreign ﬁshing exploitation increasing from 1995 (Weir, 2009),
coastal communities have been disproportionally disadvantaged and fundamentally threatened
in their livelihood (Marchal, 2011).
Cultural acceptability and skills
Piracy has also a considerable cultural dimension. In order for piracy to prevail it requires some
sense of legitimacy. Foot soldiers have to be recruited and convinced that to engage in piracy is a
legitimate activity and the majority of piracy operations are dependent on support from local com-
munities, which provide shelter, food and other supplies. In the case of Somalia cultural accept-
ability has mainly been provided through the prevalence of a narrative which justiﬁes piracy as a
legitimate response to maritime insecurity. In this “coast guard narrative” piracy is projected as a
legitimate, almost state-like practice of protecting coastal waters against outside threats such as
illegal resource exploitation or environmental crime (Bueger, 2013a). This narrative of the ben-
evolent protective character of piracy has been a crucial factor in recruitment as well as for ensur-
ing the support of local communities.
Another cultural dimension is the availability of skills required for piracy among the popu-
lace. Such skills include navigation, boarding, weapon handling or negotiation skills. Skills
necessary to perform piracy are widespread in Somalia and form part of a traditional cultural
repertoire. This includes the navigation skills of ﬁshermen and dhow traders, or the negotiation
skills provided by a society governed by customary law and informal governance processes (e.g.
Menkhaus, 2004). Skills such as the handling of weapons have been learned in decades of civil
war; others, such as the handling of navigation devices or boarding skills, have been learned in
attempts at setting up coast guards. As Stig Jarle Hansen (2008) has shown many of the skills
required for contemporary piracy, including the use of GPS, maritime tracking or techniques of
boarding ships, were transferred to Somalia by a private security contractor, which was hired to
train the Puntland coast guard. Also (land-based) kidnap and ransom taking had become a wide-
spread practice in Somalia before the rise of piracy, hence skills and experience most likely have
transferred to piracy. As Ken Menkhaus (2009, p. 23) remarks “the act of piracy is little more
than an extension of activities that armed groups have engaged in for years: militia roadblocks,
extortion and kid napping for ransom are a staple source of income for gangs and militias in
Somalia”.
Entrepreneurs
Taken together these factors provide us with a sufﬁcient heuristic for the conditions under which
piracy emerges and ﬂourishes. Different combinations and variations in degree also provide, as
shown by Hastings (2009), an explanation for different forms of piracy and levels of sophisti-
cation. These factors however largely emphasize structural conditions. An additional dimension
will also require consideration, that is, the actor dimension. To a certain degree piracy will always
depend on individual actors which plan, prepare and invest in piracy operations. A business plan
needs to be developed. Hence, a considerable driving force of piracy will always be criminal-
minded “entrepreneurs”. For the case of Somalia such entrepreneurs included individuals such
as Mohamed Abdi Hassan “Afweyne”, and the early generation pirate leaders Garad Muhammed,
Boya or Farah Abdullahi who, following Hansen (2009), invented and introduced the Somali
kidnap and ransom form of piracy (see also Marchal, 2011).
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Understanding the decline of Somali piracy
Against this heuristic backdrop Somali piracy almost provides a model case for contemporary
piracy. How does this heuristic help us to understand the decline of Somali piracy and what con-
clusions does it suggest for the likelihood that piracy will return?
A quite impressive arsenal of international measures has been put in motion since 2008 to
address Somali piracy. As discussed in detail elsewhere,5 the activities include the international
naval operations, self-defensive measures by the shipping industry, a global prosecution pro-
gramme, security sector reform and infrastructure projects such as in the frame of the counter-
piracy programme of the United Nations Ofﬁce of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the European
Union’s capacity building mission EUCAP Nestor, the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC)
process led by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), and a range of counter-piracy
awareness campaigns and reconstruction projects. As well summarized in the statement by US
counter-piracy coordinator Donna Hopkins below, there are at least four reasons for the decline
of Somali piracy:
One is the willingness of private ship owners and commercial maritime companies to arm their
ships and to adopt best management practices that prevent pirate boardings in the ﬁrst place. I give
the commercial industry a great deal of credit for that enlightened self-interest. I know it is expensive
and difﬁcult but it has proven completely effective and that no ship that carries armed security has
been hijacked, ever, to date. The second is the extremely good and close cooperation between the
naval forces from many nations who are working together productively off the Horn of Africa to
disrupt and repress the pirate actions. [… ] Third, I would say the increased willingness of countries
to prosecute pirates in their national courts. Right now there are 1148 pirates either suspected or
convicted in custody in 21 countries. We have put a signiﬁcant dent in the prospective pirate
population in that respect. So no longer can prospective pirates count on impunity from prosecution.
Fourth, [… ] Somali communities along the coastal areas of Somalia themselves have grown
disgusted by the toxic and corrosive effect of pirates in their communities and they are starting to
run the pirates out of town. (cited in “Maritime TV panel discussion with Donna Hopkins”, 2013)
Hopkins hence suggests that we should pay attention to four main reasons which explain the
decline of piracy: self-defensive measures by the shipping industry including compliance with
the best-management practices (BMP) and the employment of armed guards; the international
naval surveillance, patrol and guarding programme; the prosecution of piracy suspects; and the
declining support by local communities. Hopkins’ position is not unique, but widely shared
among counter-piracy practitioners. If we interpret these four factors in the light of the above
heuristic, we can come to the following conclusions.
Three of the reasons provided for the decline of Somali piracy are related to the changing char-
acter of law enforcement. The international naval programme directly affects and improves law
enforcement in the region’s waters. The global prosecution programme supported at sea by the
work of naval forces and on land by the UNODC’s counter-piracy programme equally has
direct impact on the quality of law enforcement and the effective persecution of piracy suspects.
If only indirectly, we might also want to include the self-defensive measures of the industry,
notably the use of armed guards on board vessels as a contribution to law enforcement. While
armed guards do not alter the risk of “getting caught” and being persecuted, they imply a signiﬁcant
risk of “getting shot” in action and induce signiﬁcant operational costs for piracy operations. If seen
in the intermediate term, these three types of measure, arguably, do not provide sustainable sol-
utions. With the current decline in incident rates, it is likely that support for the international
naval programme will signiﬁcantly drop and spending will be cut, eventually up to a degree that
the international and national naval missions will withdraw. Presumably, also the compliance of
the international shipping industry with the BMP will decline and considering the signiﬁcant
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costs of armed guards in a very competitivemarket, it is likely that these will be withdrawnwithin a
short time span. The persecution programme, notably UNODC’s work, has amore long term orien-
tation and is geared towardsmaritime security sector reform and the rule of law.UNODC’s counter-
piracy programme is however dependent on voluntary contributions (as are other projects such as
the IMO’s DCoC project). It is very likely that UNODC’s and IMO’s funding for counter-piracy
projects will be cut considerably in the near future. Then, we can reasonably expect that these
factors have not signiﬁcantly altered the problem of weak law enforcement in the inter-medium
and long term. This does, however, not imply that the investments made in counter-piracy infra-
structure may not be useful in the future. Indeed, the current infrastructures can provide, if appro-
priately institutionalized and funded in the medium term, the seeds for transforming the quality of
law enforcement in the region’s waters in the long run.
Hopkins’ fourth factor, the growing lack of support or even resistance to piracy operations
by local communities, can be interpreted in the light of economic dislocation as well as cultural
acceptability. Arguably the declining community support for piracy gangs has much to do with
the levels of insecurity pirates have brought to communities and has to be seen in relation to
reports which suggest growing inter-pirate violence, and the spread of crime, use of narcotics
and prostitution in the villages that supported pirate operations.6 Seen in the light of economic
dislocation, the international counter-piracy programme has ﬁrstly clearly increased attention for
the needs of local coastal communities. Meetings between naval forces and village elders, as
well as revived development investments, for instance, in the ﬁshing sector, have impacted
on the level these communities are recognized as actors and are economically situated.7 In
consequence, these communities have become less marginalized. Taken together with the
costs that have to be paid for piracy-induced insecurity, this has also affected the economic
beneﬁt calculations of local communities. Understood in the light of cultural acceptability the
growing resistance points to the declining success of the coast guard narrative as a mean of
legitimizing piracy. This is related to the increasing implausibility of the narrative’s core
element, that piracy is a form of protection, but also to the impact of the counter-piracy
campaign which provides a counter-narrative and presents piracy as immoral and criminal
(Bueger, 2012). Communities will continue to play an important role in counter-piracy. To
sustain their disapproval of piracy will however depend on ongoing assistance whether it is
in the form of development aid, infrastructure programmes or the provision of employment
opportunities.
Interpreting the decline of Somali piracy in the light of the heuristic of factors triggering
piracy however also reveals what factors have not been signiﬁcantly altered by the international
counter-piracy measures. Due to its geographical location and long coastline, Somalia will always
be a fruitful terrain for piracy operations. The skills required for piracy remain widespread. And
the regional waters remain a zone of insecurity host to a broad range of illegal activities. Although
the quality of law enforcement, inter-state cooperation, intelligence and evidence sharing and the
judicial sector have been improved it is questionable how sustainable these developments are. In
short, piracy in Somalia might return, if the lessons of the past outbreak are not learned and
sustainable structures are put in place.
Key lessons of Somali piracy
What are the broader lessons of Somali piracy for maritime security governance? I suggest there
are a number of key lessons that can be learned from Somali piracy. Piracy is in many ways not
only the most visible maritime security challenge, but also a paradigmatic one.8 These lessons
are hence not exclusively related to Somalia, or East Africa, but lessons that refer to the wider
international approach to maritime security governance.
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Maritime insecurities are interdependent
As discussed above piracy develops in a larger context of maritime insecurity. If coastlines, exclu-
sive economic zones or the international sea are weakly governed, host a broad range of illegal
activities, maritime violence is naturalized or sea transport militarized, threats such as piracy
are more likely to occur. Different illegal activities re-enforce and trigger each other. Maritime
threats should hence been seen as interdependent and the goal has to be to address the full
spectrum of maritime insecurities.
Maritime security threats are sticky, asymmetric, quickly escalate and can have global
effects
Although piracy is only one of several other maritime security threats it can be considered as a para-
digmatic one. Piracy illustrates that maritime security threats tend to be sticky. Once they emerge
they are difﬁcult to eradicate. Hence prevention strategies and mechanisms are crucial. As docu-
mented by the rise of Somali piracy between 2005 and 2010, maritime security threats can
quickly escalate. If threats cannot be prevented it is important to have early warning and early
response mechanisms in place in order to avoid escalation. Maritime security threats are moreover
asymmetric. They cannot be addressed bymilitary might or ﬁrepower alone. They require complex
and coordinated responses and tactical innovation. Somali piracy moreover forcefully reveals how
apparently local problems can have considerable global effects. Maritime insecurity will hence
have to be understood as a problem requiring ongoing international attention and action.
Maritime security is situated in a security–development nexus
Piracy highlights that maritime security threats have a security as well as a development dimen-
sion. Factors such as corruption, economic dislocation, cultural acceptability or skills emphasize
that development policies are crucial in addressing maritime insecurity. This includes awareness
campaigns, reintegration programmes, as well as vocational training or infrastructure measures
which are beneﬁcial to marginalized coastal populations. Moreover, as a World Bank (2013)
report on piracy stressed, maritime threats such as piracy have signiﬁcant economic conse-
quences. The beneﬁts of a country’s ports, coastline and exclusive economic zone can only be
realized in the realm of good maritime governance. This calls for a close coordination between
security and development policies and actors. Yet, as studies of the security–development
nexus have shown, coordinating or even integrating security and development policies and
actors is very intricate.9 Different thought styles, vocabularies, institutional structures, normative
frameworks as well as common prejudices between development and security practitioners make
integrated approaches difﬁcult. While in conceptual terms coordination is logical, in practice this
is difﬁcult to achieve.
Functional cooperation works
The most successful cooperative mechanisms to curb Somali piracy were those which worked on
a functional, rather than a diplomatic or political level. Part of the reason why the DCoC or the
Shared Awareness and Deconﬂiction Mechanism (SHADE) are successful in coordinating diverse
actors (some of them adversaries) is that they are technical and centred on coordination, training
and information sharing primarily among specialists and experts, such as coast guards, naval
ofﬁcers or maritime specialists (Bueger, 2013b). This forcefully highlights that maritime security
challenges do not necessarily, or primarily, have to be addressed on a political level. Instead of
putting political declarations or grand strategies ﬁrst, agreements tend to work best if they are
pragmatic, problem-oriented and technical in character.
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Technology is only one part of the solution
To emphasize the importance of functional cooperation does not imply that technology is the
single most important component in addressing maritime security. Much emphasis has been
placed in East Africa on developing maritime surveillance capacities (maritime domain aware-
ness) and information sharing platforms. One needs to keep in mind that given the nature and
“unruliness” of maritime space, surveillance capacities will never be able to give a full real-
time depiction of what happens at sea. Moreover, data on movements and incidents, even if
they are accurate and adequately shared, are only meaningful if the political will and the capabili-
ties exist to act upon this knowledge. Hence, technological infrastructure is only one part of the
broader spectrum of measures that are required for maritime security.
Good law does not imply good law enforcement
A powerful lesson of Somali piracy is that it demonstrates that good law is not the same as good
law enforcement. While UNCLOS provided a sufﬁcient legal framework to address a threat such
as piracy, the problem that the international community faced was how to enforce the law.10 This
includes implementation challenges such as how to work across different legal regimes, for
instance, in transferring suspects. Hence, even if it is important that states improve their legal
codes to respond to maritime security challenges, this does not necessarily or directly translate
into good law enforcement.
Private–public coordination is crucial
One of the reasons for the success in containing Somali piracy has been the measures adopted by
the industry. This includes centrally the best management practices (BMP). The success of the
BMP is telling in at least two regards. Firstly, the BMP were developed in a form of public–
private partnership. Originally drafted by a group of industry representatives, the guidelines
were reﬁned and ﬁnalized in consultations with the IMO as well as the UN Contact Group to
Counter Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (see Hansen, 2012). The BMP are a form of self-regu-
lation, and compliance is either self-enforced or supported by insurance policies. Secondly, the
cornerstone of the BMP is the cooperation between state agencies and the industry. Shipping com-
panies agree to coordinate with naval agencies by registering their movements. The coordination
between private agencies, that is, actors from the shipping, ﬁshing and resource industry, and state
agencies is crucial for maritime security. This also includes the relation between private security
providers and state actors.
Conclusion
The problem of Somali piracy has led to a fundamental re-evaluation of the importance of mar-
itime security for the African continent, and indeed there is a strong international consensus to act
and support regional actors to tackle maritime security challenges. In this sense, piracy has opened
a window of opportunity to re-organize maritime security governance and build sustainable insti-
tutions. With the decline of Somali piracy there is however also the risk that the “momentum”
could get lost soon and that the window of opportunity closes. It is vital that the international com-
munity starts learning from piracy, countries restructure their maritime sector and a sufﬁcient
amount of resources is made available for implementing programmes that tackle maritime
insecurity.
What is required is nothing less than fundamental reforms of the maritime security sector on
national and regional levels which acknowledge the aforementioned lessons. A mainstreaming of
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maritime security concerns across international donor policies will be needed. If maritime inse-
curity breeds threats, then the long term goal has to be to work towards de-securitizing the mar-
itime and building regional maritime security communities. This, in the end, might be the core
paradox of current strategies: in order to achieve a de-securitization of the sea in the long run,
what is ﬁrst required is a securitization, that is, the recognition for the serious impact that maritime
threats have on economies, livelihoods and national and international security interests.
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